Modern Views of Plato's Silence

by James M. Rhodes

Part 9

This excerpt from Professor Rhodes's Eros, Wisdom and Silence: Plato's Erotic Dialogues is offered here with permission of Professor Rhodes and his publisher, the University of Missouri Press, from whom more information about the book may be obtained. This excerpt is from Chapter Two which will be presented here in its entirety.

Stanley Rosen   

Stanley Rosen himself is a grateful student of Leo Strauss who never­theless announces: "I am in considerable disagreement with Strauss's gen­eral program." ¹¹⁵ His dissent from Strauss assimilates irony to postmod­ernism, pressing esotericism in rhetorical directions that Strauss does not wish to take. 

Rosen agrees with his teacher about much. Like Strauss, he proclaims "recognition of irony as the central problem in the interpretation of Plato." Although he dislikes the "great theologian," he also accepts Schleiermacher's "canon of interpretation," especially with regard to the nexus be­tween form and substance in Plato's works, and the importance of context. He echoes Strauss, and reaffirms Schleiermacher, in asserting that "those who extract what they take to be Plato's theoretical views or 'arguments' from their dialogical and poetic presentation are studying images of their own theoretical presuppositions, but not Plato." Again like Strauss, he dis­avows Schleiermacher by saying: "In sum, it is entirely clear that Plato practices 'esotericism.' " ¹¹⁶ How, then, does he differ from Strauss? 

The answer is revealed in Rosen's choice of a word, when he states that he repudiates Strauss's "program." Apparently, a "program" has two parts, one for each of the two queries that Rosen puts to Strauss: "whether his intentions were sound and his rhetoric suitable to the task." ¹¹⁷ It is significant that a "program" is composed of "intentions and rhetoric," and not of other elements that one might have imagined to be characteristic of philosophy, such as wonder and a plan of inquiry. We may expect that Rosen will disapprove of Strauss's intentions and rhetoric. 

So, what were Strauss's intentions? How could we know whether they were sound? These questions are illuminated by what appears to be Rosen's idea of the intention of all genuine philosophers. Rosen makes several in­triguing statements on this subject: "The ancient philosophers rejected the warnings of the poets, as exemplified in Pindar's admonition: 'do not strive to be a god.'" "The man of religious faith regards it as madness to at­tempt to become a god. The pagan philosophers, especially those of the Socratic school, thought otherwise." Socrates says in the Philebus, "[T]he wise all agree, thereby exalting themselves, that intellect [nous] is king for us of heaven and earth." The "philosophical question of the Platonic di­alogues, and in particular of the Phaedrus," is "how can a human being become a god?"

The political name of individuals "who aspire to be gods" is "philosopher-kings." Alexandre Kojève is "exactly like Plato" in that he tries "to become a god." Plato was a "seriously playful god." Aristotle says in the Ethics that the theoretical life is higher than human life, adding: "Not qua human will one live it, but he will achieve it by virtue of something divine in him. ... If then the intellect is divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life." In announc­ing this fact, "Aristotle is even more explicit than Plato. . . . Aristotle's rep­resentation of himself as divine is a radical simplification of Plato's poetic evasiveness." Generally, "As Socrates puts it, the classical philosopher wills that the intellect be god." As for the moderns, "Kant acts not like a humble empirical scientist but like a world-maker or god."