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"On the Hegelian account, one denies the separation of the eternal from the temporal, or identifies the two as the structure of the Concept, that is, the philosophical speech about the totality or the whole.... As a consequence,... he who is able to repeat the totality of this discourse becomes a god." Nietzsche, "like all great philosophers, engages in the divine prerogative of willing a world into being and hence of creating a way of life." Generally, "from Descartes forward, the intellect resolves that the will be god." Rosen himself does not wish to risk "being excluded from the company of the gods." Does Strauss share the grand obsession? Rosen asserts: "Strauss and Kojève, and Strauss as much as Kojève (once we put aside Strauss's exoteric flirtation with Hebraic tradition) are atheists who wish to be gods."
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What does Rosen mean by "being a god"? In one place, Rosen replies that to be a god is to be causa sui. Is this, then, really Strauss's highest, most secret wish? Strauss never says this in so many words. However, as a student of Strauss, Rosen might know more than an outsider.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Strauss's intentions might be "sound." Now Rosen sees a problem. The classical philosophers of the Socratic school "understand by praxis the construction of a cosmos in which there is an exoteric separation of theoria and poiesis." Strauss follows them, but the moderns do not. Rosen observes further that the "quarrel between the ancients and the moderns . . . has its inner or esoteric meaning in the question quid sit deus?" 119 Evidently, one can fail to understand what it means to be a god and, thus, fail to become a god by taking the wrong stand on the issue of whether there should be an exoteric separation of theoria and poiesis. Why is that?
The explanation of this mistake seems to depend on the difference between the ancient and modern positions on the necessity of thoroughly consistent esotericism, or on the relative merits of "strong" and "weak" irony. In Persecution, Strauss says that the earlier philosophers saw the gulf between the wise and the vulgar as "a basic fact of human nature which could not be influenced by any progress of popular education." These classical thinkers practiced strong esotericism by adhering to the rule that public communication of the philosophic or scientific truth was undesirable for all times.
