from the Northern Lights
St. Augustine, the Limits
of Moral Action, and Politics -Pt 2
by John von Heyking
John von Heyking is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge. He is an author and editor and has edited Vols 7 and 8 of the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. His biographical notice is found here. The following is taken from his book Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World, which is available here from the Publisher. This excerpt is taken from chapter 4 of the book, "Ordo Amoris and Political Prudence" and appears here with permission. It appears in three parts.
Moral Reasoning in Extreme Circumstances (continued)
§1. Lying (concluded)
Augustine provides some exceptions to this general prohibition [against lying] that actually fulfill the obligation to love God and neighbor. In considering the example of hiding an innocent human being from persecution, he cites as exemplary the actions of Bishop Firmus of Thagaste who suffered tortures to protect a persecuted man. Firmus stated that he would neither lie nor betray the man. He suffered physical torments until the impressed emperor granted pardon for the man whom Firmus was protecting. In cases where one refuses to betray and lie, Augustine argues: "Whatever you suffer for this act of fidelity and kindness, then, is not only judged as unmerited but even as praiseworthy, with the exception of those pains which are said to be suffered not courageously but basely and shamefully."
Augustine praises Firmus's fortitude and righteousness. However, he considers the more likely possibility of how a more timid person, placed in similar circumstances, would react. Augustine does not state that a more timid person sins because he cannot undergo similar torments. Instead, he states that Firmus understood the principle of Scriptures "better (melius) and fulfilled their commands more courageously (fortiter)."16 He does not state categorically that the timid person does not understand Scripture or does not fulfill its commands. He wrote in the comparative case, which leaves room for telling falsehoods in certain extreme circumstances where truth telling would cause one to suffer shamefully and basely.
Augustine also admits that speaking falsely can fulfill the obligations of neighborly love. He states that it is actually unjust not to lie to protect another in cases where someone wishes to commit an injustice against another. He provides the case of lying to prevent rape, but does not limit the principle to that case:
[W]e should deter, even by our sins, those assaults which are perpetrated upon a human being so that he is defiled, and whatever is done for this purpose, namely, to prevent uncleanness, should not be called sin. For, that is not a sin which happens in such a way that one would be justly blamed if it were not done . . . . There would be no sin if action were taken to avoid the defilement. Therefore, whoever has lied in order to avoid such situations does not sin.17
Lying is not only permissible in certain circumstances, but also required because not lying would involve implication in the sins of another. This also means that lying is necessary in a case where one is faced with someone of such vicious or deranged disposition that that person is incapable of acting virtuously. Such situations are rare, and, as we shall see, Augustine places the duty of bringing such a person to virtue on the shoulders of the one who must lie.
Augustine argues elsewhere that, when faced with someone who is incapable of hearing the truth, one must first attempt to remove what hinders that person from appreciating truth and virtue:
"The first thing to do, then, is to remove the hindrances which bring about his failure to be receptive. For certainly if it is his degenerate condition (sordes) that renders him unreceptive, he must be made clean either by word or by deed as far as that is possible for us."18
In using the phrase "as far as that is possible for us," Augustine indicates that sometimes it is not possible for us to do this, and that it might be necessary to lie to avoid being implicated in another's sin. Lying in this instance would entail uttering a falsehood about the particular situation, but one that communicates the universal truth about God, which the auditor may be incapable or unwilling to receive.
Augustine applies this idea elsewhere when he discusses the Platonic example of lying in order not to return a sword to a friend who has gone mad:
As a matter of fact, where one does not have a double heart (duplex cor), there cannot be said to be a lie. As if, for example, a sword be entrusted to anyone, and he promises to return it, when he who entrusted it to him shall demand it: if he chance to require his sword when in a fit of madness, it is clear it must not be returned then, lest he kill either himself or others, until soundness of mind be restored to him. Here then is no duplicity (Hic ideo non habet duplex cor), because he, to whom the sword was entrusted, when he promised that he would return it at the other's demand, did not imagine that he could require it when in a fit of madness.
But even the Lord concealed the truth, when He said to the disciples, not yet strong enough, "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." (EnP 5.7, quoting John 16:22)
Lying requires there to be a double heart, but this example indicates that one does not have a double heart if one utters a falsehood to someone incapable of using well the truth; thus, lying is permissible if it communicates justice.
This principle is illustrated differently in Augustine's explanation of the lying spirit that God sent to King Ahab (83Q 53.2, commenting on 1 Kings 22:20-23). This example is used to show how God utilizes base things to effect his providence, and Augustine argues that the lying spirit misled King Ahab about his military victory but not about the truth about God, which the king rejected. Ahab intended to attack Ramothgilead, and he ordered his court prophets to provide good news about his chance of success.
After the sycophant court prophets assured him of victory, the prophet Micaiah provided good news of which the meaning did not straightforwardly refer to King Ahab's intended project: "Go, and prosper; for the Lord shall deliver it into the hand of the king" (1 Kings 22:15). Yahweh sent a lying spirit to speak through the sycophant prophets to lure Ahab to his destruction. Micaiah did not prophesy success in battle, but then prophesied to one of the court prophets: "Behold, thou shalt see in that day when thou shall go into an inner chamber to hide thyself" (1 Kings 22:25). Ahab threw Micaiah into prison and then proceeded to be killed in battle, thus fulfilling Yahweh's purpose.
Augustine observes:
"Thus, if anyone merits being deceived, not only does God not deceive by that person by himself . . . . Rather, God deceives either through the man who has not yet divested himself of such desires or through the angel who, because of his perverseness of will, has been appointed to the lowest station in nature, either in punishment for his sins or for the exercise and cleansing of those who are reborn through God's power" (83Q 53.2).
In other words, God does not lie. He sent the lying spirit because King Ahab was incapable or unwilling to hear the truth, and, as Micaiah's comment reflects, the lie lay originally in the court prophets and in the king.
Augustine indicates that lying is necessary to hide from one's attackers, and that one may send those attackers to a third party if that third party will suffer lesser injuries and, most important, if that third party consents:
If anyone who can be concealed by a lie is sought for violation, who dares to say that such a lie should not be uttered? But, if he can be hidden only by such a lie as may injure the reputation of another by the false charge of that uncleanness for the endurance of which the first person is being sought — as if one should say to the seeker, naming a certain chaste man unblemished by crimes of this sort: "Go to him. He will manage so that you may get your pleasures more easily, for he knows and loves these things," even though the wicked person should be thus turned away from the one whom he was seeking — I am inclined to think that the reputation of one person must not be injured by a lie even to prevent the body of another from being violated.
In general, a lie must not be told for the sake of another person when by that lie a third person may be injured, even though a slighter injury may come upon him than would happen to the second party if the lie were not told; one man's bread may not be taken from him against his wishes, even though he is comparatively strong, so that a weaker person may be nourished, nor may an innocent person be scourged against his wishes so that another may not die. If the man in question is willing, however, let such an action be taken, because he is not wronged who so accedes.19
This passage demonstrates that uttering falsehoods is additionally permissible when a stronger third party consents to bear the burden of being attacked. This actualizes the principle of serving other human beings, and so shows how uttering falsehoods can fulfill the love of God and neighbor. It also points to the principle that the third party must consent to the deed.
These passages show that Augustine's injunction against lying points to a higher principle of promoting and actualizing justice in the world. Lying is generally prohibited because it prevents people from knowing how to live virtuously and provides bad examples for others to imitate.20 However, he indicates that there are extreme circumstances where truth telling is sinful and uttering falsehoods actually serves justice.
§2. Adultery
Turning now to another seemingly exceptionless rule, we find that Augustine condones adultery in extreme circumstances when it preserves marital fidelity. He provides an unusual example of a man who faced the punishment of death because he could not pay the pound of gold he owed to the imperial treasury in Antioch.21 A wealthy man offered to pay his debt on the condition that he have intercourse with the debtor's beautiful wife. The act was completed with the debtor's permission and without lust on the part of the wife, and the imperial officials were so ashamed of themselves for letting the laws put the couple into this position that they compensated the couple with an amount far exceeding the debt.
Augustine is faced with a situation where the prohibition of adultery might cause an innocent man's death. He observes that this is a horrific, extreme example, but he argues that the debtor and his wife did a just deed on three grounds. First, they followed the Pauline marriage principle that the bodies of the man and wife belong to each other (1 Cor. 7:4), and that she had received her husband's consent. Second, she performed the act without lust, thereby maintaining the purity of her love for her husband. Third, it was a heroic act in that the wife performed an action for her husband that would otherwise have been prohibited by moral rules that command her to preserve her fidelity.22
Augustine guardedly states: "I dispute nothing of this story. Let each one pass judgment as he wishes." Despite this caution, Augustine provides strong evidence that one should not view this as adultery. He states that "human sense (sensus humanus) is not ready to cast out (respuit) what happened." This in itself is insufficient because man's moral sense may be faulty, and not casting out differs from affirming an activity as rightful. The gospel forbids fornication, which Augustine has previously defined in the case of adultery as "every carnal and lustful concupiscence" but which he admits does not fit this particular case.23
The prohibition against adultery is part of the wider prohibition of fornication (which also includes worshiping idols). It follows, then, that no adultery occurs when there is no fornication. The action of the woman was meant to preserve marriage and, as a result, establishes the rightful.
§3. The Possibility of Tyrannicide and Rebellion
Homicide and, more specifically, tyrannicide are the sins with the greatest political import. The general prohibition against them can be suspended only by agents of the polity who must punish criminals, and by those described in Scripture who have received a special revelation from God. For everyone else, Augustine bases his general rejection on Paul's command: "Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God" (Rom. 13:1).
Everyone must submit to political authorities; doing so only halfheartedly because one wishes to avoid the authorities' anger is insufficient, for that would be deceitful. Rather, one must go further and submit to political authorities out of love. This does not mean that Christians should be involved and implicated in political evils, however. One may resist, and gain glory, only by martyrdom:
"[W]hether the authority approves your good deed or persecutes you, 'You will have praise of him,' either when you win it by your allegiance to God, or when you earn the crown of martyrdom by persecution."24
Rather than advocating political withdrawal or perpetuating political evil, Augustine saw great merit in the ability of martyrdom to effect political reform:
[B]y confessing, embracing, and proclaiming [their faith], and for its sake enduring all things with faith and fortitude, and by dying with godly assurance, they shamed the laws by which it was forbidden, and caused them to be changed (CD 8.19).
Martyrdom is an effective mode of political reform and appears as the only mode that Augustine affirms. We will try to show, however, that Augustine's way of treating exceptions to the general rule indicates that martyrdom is not the only weapon in his arsenal of political reform. Although submission and martyrdom are general responses to political rule, he allows for rebellion in circumstances when even one's oppressor cannot be so shamed.25
In the first part of the following discussion we consider the conditions under which Augustine thought it just to have a rebellion, by showing how he thought its leader can hold public authority but not necessarily public office, and what conditions need to be met. Because Augustine bases exceptions to rebellion and killing on what appear to be an appeal to divine intervention and a suspension of otherwise absolute rules, in the second part we examine more closely how he understood that one can have knowledge of special revelation and particular providence in a way that does not offend natural reason.
Augustine lists two exceptions to the general prohibition of homicide: (1) when sanctioned by a general law and (2) in special cases sanctioned by God's command:
His rhetoric appears to suggest that exceptions are restricted to those executing positive law and those biblical examples inspired by God. The rhetoric is guarded in part because Augustine faced civil disorder during the collapse of the Roman Empire. One of the causes of disorder were the Circumcellions, a group of Donatists who claimed special dispensation to kill on behalf of God in order to rid the world of the wicked. Augustine himself narrowly escaped a Donatist assassination attempt. As a result, his rhetoric makes him appear to say that the only nonlegal exceptions to killing are allotted to those beneficiaries of direct revelation listed in Scripture and recognized by the Church's authority, such as Abraham, Jephthah, and Samson (whom he lists immediately after the passage quoted above). If rightful exceptions consist only in scriptural examples and those recognized by the Church, must politics necessarily be subservient to the Church?
Augustine's language is guarded, but his choice of words indicates that the person carrying the public power (personam gerem publicae potestatis) refers primarily to the authority of a virtuous human being and secondarily to an officeholder.27 Because Augustine appears generally to speak of political power as something wielded by actual officeholders, evidence must be pieced together from various sources to show that the power he mentions in the above passage may include individuals without official power. The distinction between the worth of the individual and his office was actually close to Augustine's own experience, as it formed the basis for the Roman understanding of political power and understanding of the office of dictator, which relied on the virtue of someone hitherto without political office who temporarily had to set aside the laws in order to save the republic.28 
16. Augustine, On Lying, 13.23-24.
17. "|I|lla vero quae ita committuntur in hominem, ut eum faciant immundum, etiam peccatis nostris evitare debeamus; ac per hoc nec peccata dicenda sint, quae propterea fiunt ut ilia immundi-tia devitetur. Quidquid enim ita fit, ut nisi fieret, juste reprehenderetur, non est peccatum. . . . Nullum enim peccatum esset, quidquid propter illa evitanda factum esset. Propter haec igitur evitanda quisquis mentitus fuerit, non peccat" (ibid., 9.15).
18. Augustine, Lord's Sermon on the Mount, 2.20.69.
19. Augustine, On Lying, 9.16.
20. This rule governs Augustine's criticism of pagan civil theology, which lies about the gods. See CD 4.27, 6.6, 6.10.[CD as used here stands for De Civitate Dei; in English: The City of God—ed]
21. Augustine, Lord's Sermon on the Mount, 1.16.50. See Fortin, "Problem of Goodness," 184-86.
22. This compares with Augustine's argument that Abraham did not sin by impregnating Hagar, Sarah's handmaiden: "[I]n using Hagar he had guarded the chastity of Sarah his wife, and had gratified her will and not his own" (CD 16.25).
23. Augustine, Lord's Sermon on the Mount, 1.12.36.
24. Augustine, Augustine on the Romans: Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans and Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 72.1-74.3.
25. See Burnell, "Problem of Service." He argues that Augustine's affirmation of the justice of rebellion can be seen in his treatment of Rome's expulsion of the Tarquins (CD 3.15-16), his allowance for resistance against the revolt led by Spartacus (CD 4.5, 4.15), just war (CD 19.7), and his treatment of Virgil's monster, Cacus, as apolitical analogy (CD 19.12). This section shows that Augustine's justification involves fulfilling the moral principle rather than in suspending it, and it extends Burnell's discussion of the Cacus example to show that rebellion can be rightful to secure social and political goods in addition to material goods.
26. "Quasdam vero exceptiones eadem ipsa divina fecit auctoritas, ut non liceat hominem occidi. Sed his exceptis, quos Deus occidi iubet sive data lege sive ad personam pro tempore expressa iussione (non autem ipse occidit, qui ministerium debet iubenti, sicut adminiculum gladius utenti; et ideo nequaquam contra hoc praeceptum fecerunt, quo dictum est. Non occides, qui Deo auctore bella gesserunt aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis secundum eius leges, hoc est, iustissimae rationis imperium, scleratos morete punierunt)."
27. Augustine's usage contrasts with that of John of Salisbury who signified the prince as the gerem personam publicam (Policraticus, 4.2). John equates the term with an officeholder, whereas Augustine leaves informal power open as a possibility. It also signifies an officeholder in the writings of Louis the Pious (814-840) and in the Synods of Worms and Paris (829) (see Voegelin, The Middles Ages to Aquinas, vol. 2 of History of Political Ideas, 62, 86).
28. Lendon, Empire of Honour, 16.See Livy, Ab urbe condita, 2.18. Augustine used Livy as a source of Roman history (James J. O'Donnell, "Augustine's Classical Readings," 160; see also Hagendahl, Latin Classics, 1:195-206). In general, see Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 15-28.
